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Abstract
The increase in secure web services and encrypted network communication makes the
network analysis of encrypted web traffic of utmost importance. This research evaluates
the use of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms to classify web services within encrypted
Transport Layer Security (TLS) flows. The ML algorithms are compared primarily
based on classification accuracy. The execution time of the classifiers, however, are also
considered as classifiers must be able determine labels quickly to be used in near real-time
network protection devices.
The first 12 packets of a flow are analyzed using the following five ML algorithms:
Naı¨ve Bayes, NBTree, LibSVM, J4.8, and AdaBoost+J4.8. Every experiment is run using
10-fold cross validation and 16 distinct web services as labels. With the exception of Naı¨ve
Bayes the algorithms perform with an accuracy greater than 96%. AdaBoost+J4.8 and
J4.8 produce the best accuracies and runtimes. While NBTree and LibSVM both perform
marginally worse than AdaBoost+J4.8 and J4.8 in accuracy, their runtimes are each at least
an order of magnitude greater.
Additional experiments show the accuracy and runtimes of J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8
initially increase as the flow lengths analyzed increase. J4.8 reaches a peak accuracy of
97.99% at 14 packets. AdaBoost+J4.8 peaks later at 18 packets with 98.41% accuracy.
AdaBoost+J4.8 requires 21.55 microseconds to classify a single flow at peak accuracy,
while J4.8 requires only 2.37 microseconds to classify at peak accuracy. The quick runtimes
and high accuracies of the J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 indicate that these ML algorithms are
good choices for near real-time classification of web services within an encrypted TLS
flow.
iv
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I. Introduction
1.1 Problem Definition
Network analysis is a useful and sometimes critical tool in network administration.
It is used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to monitor the traffic on their networks
and provide a consistent Quality of Service (QoS) to their customers [9]. Network
administrators can employ network analysis tools that detect malware intrusion and
data exfiltration, enabling automatic blocking and reporting of such communication [8].
However, encryption interferes with analysis of this communication [8]. Many traditional
network analysis devices cannot effectively analyze encrypted network traffic.
More and more applications are moving to the cloud and using web-based services [10,
18]. These web based services often use encrypting network protocols such as Transport
Layer Security (TLS) [16, 44, 50]. As the amount of TLS traffic increases, the ability to
examine TLS flows for security risks becomes more important.
1.2 Goals
This research provides a method of quickly classifying a web service within an
encrypted network traffic flow. Previous research has analyzed the ability of Machine
Learning (ML) algorithms to classify applications and protocols associated with network
traffic [33]. Further research shows the feasibility of using ML algorithms to determine
whether a single application is associated with an encrypted traffic flow from a mix of
other traffic [5]. ML algorithms are also useful in near real-time classification of network
1
traffic [11]. This research builds upon previous research by measuring the efficacy of ML
algorithms in classifying 16 types of web services within TLS flows. It is hypothesized that
the tested ML algorithms will be able to successfully classify web services associated with
encrypted network flows. It is further hypothesized that the accuracy and runtime of the
ML algorithms will increase as the amount of the network traffic flow analyzed increases.
The high-level motivating goal of this research is to improve the ability of network
analysis devices to reduce malware intrusion and data exfiltration via encrypted network
communications. While the technique analyzed in this research does not attempt to
identify particular instances of intrusion or exfiltration, it does enable the enforcement of
broader policies to mitigate these risks. By classifying encrypted web services, network
administrators can detect and prevent the use of unapproved web services. This motivating
goal drives two low-level quantifiable research goals.
The first goal is to assess which ML algorithms are likely to perform well in classifying
encrypted web traffic. Initial experiments are run to test each of five ML algorithms over
an identical set of traffic. The algorithms that perform the best with respect to accuracy and
runtime are used for the remainder of the experiments.
The second goal of this research is to determine how many packets are necessary to
reach an acceptable classification accuracy. The runtime and accuracy are hypothesized
to increase as the number of packets analyzed increases. While a solution that optimizes
both metrics probably does not exist, this research quantifies each metric individually for
increasing flow lengths analyzed, starting from the beginning of the flow. The beginning of
the flow is used due to success in previous research.
1.3 Overview
This chapter defines the goals of this research and the problem it sets out to solve.
Chapter 2 describes the basics of network analysis, network encryption, ML, and how they
interact before reviewing the current literature in this field of study. Chapter 3 discusses
2
the experimental setup, including the generation of the test data, and how the performance
of the ML algorithms is measured. Chapter 4 reports the findings of the experiments.
Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions drawn from this research and the suggestions for future
work.
3
II. Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the theory and background information necessary to understand
the following chapters. Section 2.2 briefly reviews network protocols. Section 2.3
discusses the basics of network analysis. Section 2.4 discusses the current state of network
encryption. Section 2.5 defines ML and the ML algorithms used later is this research.
Section 2.6 outlines the current solutions for analyzing encrypted network traffic and the
past research done in the field.
2.2 TCP/IP
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP) are the principal
protocols of the Internet [28]. IP is a networking protocol used for communication between
nodes in the Internet [28]. IP sends data messages in small bursts known as packets. These
packets consist of two parts, the header and the payload [39]. The header contains enough
information for the packet to reach its destination [39]. TCP is used to provide reliable
communication and is usually encapsulated as the IP payload [28]. TCP also uses a header
and payload, with header flags for connection management, a checksum for validation, and
fields for verfiying all packets were received [40]. If an Ethernet connection is used between
two nodes in the Internet, the IP packets are encapsulated within an Ethernet frame [27].
Figure 2.1 shows the fields within Ethernet, TCP, and IP headers.
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2.3 Network Analysis
Network analysis plays an important role in network security. With the threat
of malware increasing, many network administrators have deployed tools to perform
network analysis, with the intent of preventing intrusion. These tools, known as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs), inspect all incoming traffic to determine if any is malicious [9].
Organizations whose network contains sensitive information have also deployed systems
that monitor traffic leaving their network to detect and prevent sensitive data from being
stolen over their network [8]. Rather than concerning themselves with malicious or
sensitive data, ISPs use network analysis to maintain QoS for their customers [35]. They
maintain QoS by prioritizing network traffic based on the type of traffic, or the application
creating and using the traffic. Some network applications require a constant stream
of packets to function properly, while others, such as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) applications,
download large amounts of data, but do not have a strict timing requirement [35]. An
estimated 50%-70% of Internet traffic is P2P [25]. By prioritizing the time sensitive
traffic and throttling bandwidth intensive, time-insensitive traffic ISPs can better serve their
customers. Network Analysis applications use either Shallow Packet Inspection (SPI) or
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) (or some combination of the two). These two distinct forms
of network analysis use different analytical tools to determine the type of information
traversing the network.
The network analysis tools designed to control malware intrusion and data exfiltration
are primarily concerned with analyzing the network communication between a set of
controlled computing systems on a protected network and uncontrolled computing systems
external to the protected network [11, 30]. ISPs face a different problem in that they do
not control the end-point machines internal or external to their network. Instead, ISPs seek
to monitor communication internal to their network, in addition to communication coming
and going from their network, for the purpose of providing QoS for their customers [35].
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SPI is a type of network analysis that only inspects the headers of packets, including
the information in the TCP/IP headers used to route traffic [14]. This involves analyzing
information such as: source transport layer address (source port), destination transport
layer address (destination port), source IP address, destination IP address, and the transport
layer protocol [14]. Depending on the transport layer protocol, other information in the
header, such as flags, could also be used. The source and destination IP addresses can
be used to validate certain rules. Some government organizations might block or log all
traffic that comes or goes to foreign IP addresses [30]. Many protocols have assigned ports,
and comparing the port number to a known list may indicate which application generated
the traffic [19]. Timing characteristics can also be used to analyze the traffic [32, 33].
For example, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic: “80% of HTTP requests occur
within three seconds of each other. 95% occurs within a minute and a half” [8], HTTP
traffic that does not follow the expected pattern can be flagged as abnormal. Typically
HTTP traffic occurs in short bursts as pages load, with timing gaps while the endpoint user
consumes the information [8]. Continuous streaming of HTTP traffic, depending on the
direction of traffic, could indicate uploading or downloading files larger than traditional
web pages such as media or large files on disk.
DPI analyzes the entire packet, including the header and the payload [14]. By
analyzing the payload of the packet, the inspection tool can analyze all information that
is traversing the network, not just the type of information and where it is going. This
analysis compares the contents of messages against a list of predetermined signatures [23].
These signatures are typically produced from parts of known documents or files that the
administrators of the DPI device want to block or log [19]. For example, DPI devices
that are configured to inspect incoming traffic can compare the traffic to a list of signatures
generated from a collection of known malware. The DPI device would then be able to detect
if any of the malware on the list is in an incoming message. To prevent data from evading
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detection by being segmented into multiple messages, DPI devices cache all messages per
communication stream and reassemble the full stream [20]. A similar setup is used to
prevent and/or detect sensitive data exfiltration. Sensitive files and documents can be used
to form signatures and the signatures are stored in a collection. The DPI device just needs
to reassemble outgoing messages and compare them to the signatures of sensitive data. If
sensitive data is found in an outgoing communication stream, the DPI device can end the
communication stream and/or log the breach. Research has been done supporting the use
of DPI devices to block certain websites; Yu, Cong, Chen, and Lei [52] suggest hashing the
domains of pornographic and illegal websites so ISPs can eliminate access to them.
DPI tools face a number of challenges to successful operation. Since the DPI tool
sits between endpoints within a protected network and the outside world, it adds delay to
all traffic that passes through it [20]. The DPI device needs to take delay into account
and implement a solution that adds a tolerable delay to the traffic delivery. The slower the
DPI device, the more traffic it must handle at a given time [20]. Consider the scenario
of one message arriving every second: if the device can process each message in less
than one second it will continue to operate correctly. If the device takes longer than one
second to analyze each flow the messages will arrive faster than it can process, and the tool
will quickly have more traffic cached than it can handle. If the amount of traffic passing
through the DPI tool exceeds the amount of traffic the tool can handle, it either blocks
excess traffic, or allows uninspected traffic through. In the first scenario users inside the
protected network or users attempting to communicate with systems inside the protected
network will experience a dropped connection, and suffer effects equivalent to a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack. If the latter happens, the DPI tool has been effectively neutralized
and cannot protect the network, allowing potentially malicious traffic onto the network
and sensitive data out of the network. In order for a DPI tool to be effective it must be
able to process network communications as fast as it can receive them [14]. To mitigate
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these throughput and delay concerns for DPI tools, researchers have investigated hardware-
based solutions, such as those utilizing FPGAs [15, 37, 43, 45, 52]. The hardware-based
solutions increase the throughput of DPI devices by eliminating the extra overhead of DPI
tools on generic hardware. Researchers are also looking at accelerated data structures, such
as bloom filters [37, 52]. SPI can also face these performance concerns.
Another method for increasing DPI throughput is to only analyze the beginning of
a communication stream [9]. Research done by Braun, Munz, and Carle suggests that
this is almost as effective as inspecting the entire communication stream [9]. Inspecting
the first ten packets of the stream can identify P2P traffic and malware identification is
usually successful using only the first 1000 bytes of a communication stream [9]. They
also suggest randomly varying the size of the stream that is inspected to prevent a malicious
endpoint from padding the beginning of a communication stream to avoid detection [38].
Restricting the length of the inspected data will only be effective if the DPI device inspects
more than the padding done by an attacker. While this technique is useful for increasing
DPI device throughput, it can be circumvented by clever attackers who pad their malicious
communications with sufficient irrelevant data.
Another concern when using DPI is privacy. Since DPI involves analyzing entire
packets, including the contents of packets, users who have DPI performed on their
communication have no privacy [38]. In corporate environments where those in charge
of network administration also own and control all computing systems on the network,
privacy is not as big a concern. ISPs do not control all the computing systems on their
networks, as customers can connect their own personal computers. ISPs performing DPI
on customers’ communication is a complicated legal issue [38].
2.4 Network Encrpytion
TLS is replacing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) as the security protocol used to encrypt
the connections between internet browsers and web servers [3, 46]. Use of TLS/SSL is
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becoming more prevalent [16, 44, 50]. In fact some application vendors are switching
to Software as a Service (SaaS) business models, which would increase the amount of
applications relying on the Internet and its security protocols [10, 18]. TLS consists
of two separate protocols, the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol
both of which are defined in Request for Comments (RFC) 5246 [21]. The TLS Record
Protocol uses symmetric cryptography and requires a reliable connection, such as that
provided by TCP. The symmetric key for the TLS Record Protocol is typically negotiated
by the TLS Handshake Protocol [21]. The TLS Handshake Protocol has three basic
properties: the endpoints’ identity can be authenticated via asymmetric cryptography; the
negotiation of the symmetric key is secure, unavailable via eavesdropping or Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) attacks; and no third party can modify the negotiation without alerting
the original endpoints [21]. TLS is designed to encapsulate other layers of traffic such as
HTTP.
The TLS Handshake Protocol includes six steps listed below from RFC 5246 [21]:
• Exchange hello messages to agree on algorithms, exchange random
values, and check for session resumption.
• Exchange the necessary cryptographic parameters to allow the client and
server to agree on a premaster secret.
• Exchange certificates and cryptographic information to allow the client
and server to authenticate themselves.
• Generate a master secret from the premaster secret and exchanged
random values.
• Provide security parameters to the record layer.
• Allow the client and server to verify that their peer has calculated
the same security parameters and that the handshake occurred without
tampering by an attacker.
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The TLS Handshake Protocol includes the option for adding extensions to the Client
Hello messages [21, 24]. These extensions provide information not required by the protocol
that will aid with opening the connection. One such extension is server name, which is
especially useful when a single physical host is running multiple virtual servers [24]. The
server name allows the phyisical host to respond with the correct certificate and initiate a
connection with the desired virtual server.
2.5 Machine Learning
Before discussing modern approaches to analyzing encrypted network traffic, a quick
background on ML is presented as it is used in many of the approaches [7, 11, 13, 22, 23,
29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 47, 49, 50]. Witten et al. [48] describe Machine Learning (ML) as
changing behavior based on input to improve performance. Russel et al. [42] describe ML
as “learning to adapt to new circumstances and to detect and extrapolate patterns.” In the
papers noted above, ML was used to do exactly that: detect and extrapolate patterns. This
research focuses on using ML algorithms to detect patterns in the packet sizing information
to extrapolate and predict the type of traffic contained within a TLS flow. ML algorithms are
given inputs called samples with each sample having a set of features. These features are
either discrete—boolean is a discrete with two values—or numeric. A learning algorithm
attempts to use the samples’ features to infer something about the samples [48].
Witten et al. [48] describe four types of machine learning: association learning, clus-
tering, numeric prediction, and classification learning. In association learning the ML al-
gorithm attempts to find associations between samples. Clustering algorithms attempt to
divide the samples into clusters, or categories, based upon their features. Numeric predic-
tion algorithms attempt to predict a numeric value given the samples [48]. Classification
algorithms, the kind used in this research, take samples—consisting of features and an as-
sociated label—and attempt to predict the label of future unlabeled samples. Classification
ML algorithms are a subset of supervised learning algorithms because they are trained with
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previously labeled samples as opposed to clustering algorithms which are just given unla-
beled samples to discern distinct groups automatically [48]. Classification algorithms have
two stages, training and classifying [48]. Training occurs when the algorithm is given the
labeled samples, classifying occurs when labels are predicted for the new unlabeled sam-
ples. There are many kinds of classification algorithms; this research focuses on the J4.8
decision tree, a variant of C4.5 [48].
2.5.1 Statistical Classifiers.
Naı¨ve Bayes is a classification algorithm that relies on Bayes’ rule of conditional
probability [48]. The mathematics will not be delved into here as this algorithm is only
briefly discussed, but Naı¨ve Bayes is used extensively in this field [13, 22, 32, 36, 47].
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are another type of ML algorithm. The SVM uses
mathematical methods to represent the feature set in a higher dimensional space, where
different labels are linearly separated [17]. This is an oversimplified explanation as a full
description would be too verbose for this discussion. For a full definition of SVM and other
kernel-based ML algorithms refer to [17].
2.5.2 Decision Trees.
Decision trees use a divide-and-conquer method to classify inputs [48]. Decision trees
consist of two types of structures, leaves and decision nodes [41]. A leaf indicates which
label—or class—is used as the final classification for the decision tree [41]. A decision
node has a condition and a sub decision tree for each possible outcome of the condition [41].
Figure 2.2 shows a very simplistic decision tree. The diamonds are decision nodes and the
ovals are leaves. When using a decision tree for classifying, the features are compared at
each subsequent node and a new branch is taken; the input features are classified when a leaf
is reached [41]. Decision trees can be efficiently implemented as nested if-else blocks [11].
They can also be simplified as rules [41]. The rule for finding a duck in the decision tree
given in Figure 2.2 would be: if and only if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck
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is it a duck. Different decision tree algorithms use different techniques to create the final
decision tree, as finding the ideal decision tree is NP-complete [41]. The creation of the
decision tree is the training part of the ML algorithm.
Does it walk like a 
Duck?
Does it quack like a 
Duck?
Duck!Penguin
Platypus
No
No
Yes
Yes
Figure 2.2: Sample Decision Tree
A Naı¨ve Bayes Tree (NBTree) is a combination of Naı¨ve Bayes and decision trees,
where the leaves are Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers [48]. Again, the full description of the NBTree
is outside the scope of this research, but they have been used with promising results in this
field [47].
J4.8 is the decision tree algorithm used in this research. It is an open source Java
implementation of C4.5 [48], which is widely used [7, 11, 29, 33, 35, 36, 47]. C4.5 was
created by Ross Quinlan [41] and is completely defined, with source code, in his book.
Only a quick summary of C4.5 is given here, for the full description refer to Quinlan’s
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book. C4.5 builds the decision tree by iterating over the training samples and making
modifications to the tree. As with most decision trees, deciding what node to insert
is determined by maximizing some gain criterion of inserting that node [41]. ID3, the
predecessor to C4.5—also written by Quinlan—used information gain [41]. Quinlan’s
definition of information is similar to entropy and is measured in bits. In the initial
publication of C4.5 Quinlan points out an inherent flaw in using information gain: it favors
conditions with more outcomes [41]. C4.5 instead relies on the gain ratio, which is defined
as the information gain divided by the potential information of dividing the tree into the
resulting number of outcomes. In addition to maximizing the gain ratio when creating
decision nodes, C4.5 further imposes the following constraint: “the information gain must
be large—at least as great as the average gain over all tests examined” [41].
There are two possible types of features in the standard form of C4.5: discrete and
numeric. If a condition of a decision node is based on a discrete feature then the decision
node will have a split for each possible value of the feature [41]. If the feature is numeric
then the tree will split with a less-than-or-equal and a greater-than condition. When
choosing the split value for a numeric condition, C4.5 uses the largest feature value that
is less than the median [41]. Since all samples must share the same set of features, a
common problem in ML is unknown features [41, 48]. That is to say, if height is a feature
of an object, all samples must have a listed value for height, though the values may differ
or be listed as unknown. If the current condition is testing an unknown feature, C4.5 takes
the previously most common branch. Decision nodes are inserted into the tree to maximize
gain ratio and creation of nodes stops when the gain ratio requirements of adding a decision
node cannot be met [41].
One common problem with ML algorithms is overfitting [41, 48]. Overfitting occurs
when the trained algorithm too closely resembles the training dataset and is not general
enough to accurately classify samples not used in training [48]. C4.5 uses pruning to reduce
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the problem of overfitting [41]. Although multiple pruning methods are discussed by
Quinlan, C4.5 uses reduced-error pruning [41]. The pruning method begins by examining
leaves and working its way up the tree. If replacing a parent node with a leaf or child
produces an acceptable error rate, then the replacement is made. Quinlan defines the error
rate for pruning as the number of items incorrectly classified by that branch divided by
the total number of items classified by that branch [41]. C4.5 uses an input parameter of
Confidence Factor (CF). A higher CF indicates a higher probability that data used in future
classifications is similar to the training data. The more similar future data will be to the
training data, the less pruning required [48]. Upper and lower limits on the error rate are
calculated based on the CF. Quinlan describes his method of determining when to prune as
doing “violence to statistical notions of sampling and confidence limits” [41]. He further
states, “Like many heuristics with questionable underpinnings, however, the estimates it
produces seem frequently to yield acceptable results” [41]. Witten et al. define this method
of replacing parent nodes with child nodes as subtree raising [48].
The final charactersitic of C4.5 to discuss is windowing. A window is a subset of
the samples used to train. The size of the windows are controlled by input parameters.
C4.5 builds a decision tree using the initial window. The next window is built by adding
approximately half of the samples incorrectly classified when classifying the samples not
in the original window [41]. This new window is used to create a new tree. C4.5 ensures
the windows chosen have the same distribution of labels as the entire training dataset [41].
Additional windows are considered until a tree is found that has no incorrect classifications
on samples outside the training windows, or the newly created trees are worse than the
previous trees [41]. For the complete definition of C4.5 please see Quinlan’s book [41].
2.5.3 Metalearning Algorithms.
Metalearning algorithms are used to increase the learning power of other ML
algorithms [48]. AdaBoost, an example of a metalearning algorithm, boosts other ML
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algorithms by iterating over multiple created classifiers of the boosted algorithm in an
attempt to lower their error [48]. Many ML algorithms use weights, including C4.5—
which uses them for unknown features—when creating classifiers. AdaBoost assigns equal
weights to all samples then uses the boosted algorithm to create a classifier and calculate
the classifier’s error. On subsequent iterations AdaBoost modifies the weights in favor of
the samples which are incorrectly classified and creates new classifiers, again calculating
their error. This cycle is repeated until the error of the new classifier is zero or is greater
than 0.5 [48]. When used to classify data, Adaboost iterates over all generated models and
returns the classification with the highest weight [48]. AdaBoost has been used successfully
in this field to improve classification accuracy [29].
2.6 Encryption and Network Analysis
2.6.1 Deep Packet Inspection.
Deep packet inspection relies on the ability to compare the communication on the
network to known signatures. When the traffic being analyzed has been altered, whether
by obfuscation or encryption, simply scanning the traffic for known signatures will not
successfully detect the signatures [8]. When faced with encrypted traffic, a DPI device
has four options. First, the device can block all encrypted traffic from entering or leaving
the network. This will prevent malicious traffic from entering the network and sensitive
data from leaving the network. Unfortunately secure traffic is often required and this
option severely limits the capabilities of the network. Second, the DPI device can allow
all encrypted traffic through. While this would not interfere with the normal use of the
network or applications requiring secure communication, it would hinder the DPI device’s
capabilities to prevent malware intrusion or sensitive data exfiltration. Another possibility
is to rely on the information in each packet that is not encrypted, essentially performing SPI
on encrypted traffic. This has merits in providing both QoS and application classification,
and is a good first step, but as discussed in the next section, it cannot—on its own—restore
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the ability of the DPI device to detect malware intrusion and sensitive data exfiltration. The
fourth and final option is to circumvent the encryption on the secure communication for
the purpose of inspection. If the DPI device can inspect the decrypted data, it can allow
the communication to pass through the device with the assurance that the device performed
as well as it would have on unencrypted communication [23]. Secure traffic that cannot
be decrypted can use any of the other three options depending on the needs of the system.
General problems with the fourth option are discussed below. SPI on encrypted traffic is
the focus of this thesis.
2.6.1.1 Current DPI Solutions.
Commercial tools currently exist that circumvent the encryption of encrypted network
traffic to allow the deployment of an inspection device that analyzes the unencrypted
contents of each flow [2]. These devices act as a gateway for all encrypted traffic that
enters or exits a network [2]. This is done by making the inspection device a certificate
authority that is trusted by all machines on the network. This lets the device replace
server certificates—and client certificates if they exist—with a new certificate that allows
the device to eavesdrop on communication. When the client views the newly generated
certificate it can confirm it is communicating with a trusted entity. This setup enables each
endpoint to communicate with the inspection device securely, and allows the inspection
device to decrypt, inspect, and re-encrypt all messages before sending them to their
original destination. It is also worth noting that this design does not explicitly handle
the case of symmetric encryption if the key is shared outside of a viewable network
communication. That is to say any secure communication that relies on a shared key to
which the DPI device does not have access will not be available for inspection. If a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based encryption scheme is used to share a symmetric key, such
as the TLS Handshake Protocol, the DPI device could detect the shared key and use that to
decrypt any further encrypted traffic in that communication stream.
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This design faces a number of problems that need addressing. First, as with most DPI
implementations, performance is a concern [19]. Weaknesses in DPI devices caused by an
overwhelming amount of traffic have already been discussed. Adding the requirement to
issue and cache certificates for all secure communication streams and handle the decryption
and encryption of traffic will add more delay to the DPI device. Not only could this delay
cause concerns for the end users of the system, but the increase in delay also prolongs the
amount of time connections must be monitored by the DPI device.
A DPI device that doubles as a certificate authority also faces the problem of
successfully detecting all encrypted traffic. The DPI device will not easily detect any
data that is encrypted on an endpoint before any communication is begun, and then uses a
normally unencrypted communication protocol to transmit the obfuscated data [19]. The
DPI device will also not be able to recognize signatures or regular expressions in obfuscated
communication.
Intercepting and decrypting all encrypted traffic also adds a new vulnerability to the
system. Since the DPI device is universally trusted on the network, a compromise to the
DPI device compromises the entire network. If an attacker can monitor the memory of the
DPI device, either through physical access or malicious code, they can see the contents of
all network traffic regardless of encryption. If an attacker gains access to the DPI device’s
private key, they can issue their own certificates that will be trusted by every system on
the network. This makes it possible for the attacker to have every communication sent to
the systems trusted. This single point of security failure means that a DPI device acting
as a Certificate Authority must have protection, both physically and in the cyber realm.
Vulnerabilities have been found in currently-available devices that function this way, as
reported by the vendor [1].
A third problem is invasion of privacy [38]. While an organization that owned or
controlled all systems on its network could enforce a certificate being installed on every
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system, an ISP would have a much harder time forcing the same requirement on its
customers. While some private companies and the government have cause to monitor all
traffic entering and leaving their controlled networks, an ISP might have trouble convincing
customers to install the ISP’s certificates, allowing the ISP to view all encrypted traffic
directed to or from their customers.
2.6.2 Shallow Packet Inspection.
Encryption changes the characteristics of network traffic, which can have negative
impacts on SPI. Multiple applications can use the same protocol—or lower level
application—for encryption, resulting in the traffic from all the applications using the same
port [38]. Many P2P applications use encryption and random ports to evade network
analysis tools [26]. The use of proxy servers can also prevent a network analysis tool
from correctly determining the source or destination of network traffic. Timing and sizing
analysis can be used to gather information about encrypted network flows. If ISPs have the
ability to accurately determine what applications are communicating on their network—
even if the communication is encrypted—then ISPs can limit applications as necessary to
preserve QoS [38]. Research has been done using ML algorithms to identify applications
utilizing both unencrypted and encrypted network traffic flows [7, 11, 29, 33, 35, 36, 47].
Some of the research in this field cites the privacy concerns created by DPI as a main reason
for using SPI [38]. While these solutions cannot accurately detect malware or sensitive data
traversing a network, they can provide other information, such as the application within the
network traffic flow. This is ideal for ISPs looking to preserve QoS and gives commercial
and government organizations the ability to enforce application restrictions or to further
inspect specific application traffic using another method. Some of the techniques and results
of SPI are discussed below.
In 2005, Moore and Zuev [33] published a list of 249 formally defined features—
called discriminators—designed to be used in statistical analysis of traffic flows. Timing
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and sizing information from a bi-directional traffic flow are used to calculated most of
the features. This set of features, or a subset, are frequently used [29, 32, 38] and this
research uses a subset, which is defined in Section 3.3. They also defined a network traffic
flow by the 5-tuple of source IP address, destination IP address, transport layer protocol—
often TCP or User Datagram Protocol (UDP)—source port number, and destination port
number. In 2005, Moore and Zuev [32] also published a paper using Bayesian analysis
techniques with this feature set. They used 377,526 manually classified flows, which had
10 distinct labels [29]. The majority of the traffic flows analyzed were unencrypted. Using
port numbers as a feature, they were able to achieve accuracy of 96.29% with a combination
of fast correlation-based filter, Naı¨ve Bayes, and kernel density estimation. The paper
also reports a drop in accuracy ranging from 1% to 56% depending on classification
method when using samples captured months apart for training and classifying. The best
classifier—defined by highest accuracy—only dropped from 96.29% to 93.73%. This
indicates that any classification process relying on network statistics should be updated
regularly especially when the network changes.
In 2006, Williams et al. [47] published a comparison of five ML algorithms—
BayesNet, C4.5, two variations of Naı¨ve Bayes, and a Naı¨ve Bayes tree—with four
methods of feature reduction when classifying unencrypted traffic flows. The labels for the
samples were determined by port number. In addition to classification accuracy, Williams
et al. measured the build and classification times of the ML algorithms. C4.5 was the
fastest algorithm for every feature set, with 54,700 classifications per second for the full
feature set. It was also the most accurate when given the complete feature set. NBTree
had comparable accuracy, but was approximately ten times slower classifying and sixty
times slower when training, for the full feature set. BayesNet and one of the Naı¨ve Bayes
variations had only slightly lower accuracy, but were still at least 20% slower than C4.5
when classifying. And although C4.5 was the second slowest of the ML algorithms to train,
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the combined highest accuracy and fastest classification time lead the authors to conclude
that C4.5 is the best for real-time classification.
In 2007, Moore and Li revisit the same datasets and labels that Moore and Zuev
studied in 2005 [29]. This time Moore and Li compare the previously best Naı¨ve Bayes
based classifier against C4.5 and C4.5 with AdaBoost. The authors only use the first five
packets of the flow to classify the traffic. Once again the data is hand classified and port
numbers are used as features. C4.5 is again the most accurate of the ML algorithms and
the fastest in classification with an accuracy of 99.8%. The high accuracy is due, at least
in part, to the inclusion of port numbers in the feature set. The bulk of the traffic analyzed
is Web-browsing, Mail, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) all of which have well defined
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) port numbers [7]. In 2009, Moore and
Li collaborated with Canini and Zadnik to produce a network edge device that classifies
network traffic flows using techniques defined in their early works [11]. The device takes
advantage of the increased speeds of using an FPGA and the simplicity in programming a
decision tree—specifically C4.5—to fully classify traffic in a full-duplex 1 Gbps line. Their
product, the AtoZ automatic traffic organizer, is well detailed in [11] and is a good example
of practical uses of this type of research.
Joint research by Osaka City University and the Oki Electric Company outlines a pos-
sible implementation that utilizes ML to accurately identify applications communicating
securely on a network [38]. They obtained their data by classifying traffic using DPI before
it entered a Virtual Private Network (VPN), then encrypting the traffic with either IPsec or
Point-To-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP). The feature set for this research is a subset of
the features defined in [33]. Their experimental results show accuracy as high as 97.4%
between four labels, depending on the applications and type of encryption [38].
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood have published numerous papers in classifying
encrypted network traffic flows. In their research they make a case for the importance of
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identifying applications within encrypted network traffic flows to IDS and QoS tasks [7].
They also discuss the ease of using non-standard ports in encrypted traffic as a first step in
anonymyzing data, and the importance of not using port numbers for identfying network
traffic flows [4–7]. In 2008 they test ML algorithm effectiveness in detecting Secure
Shell (SSH) traffic when presented with a mixture of 12 types of traffic flows [4]. Although
there are multiple traffic types, rather than attempt to classify them all, they only label flows
as either SSH or non-SSH. The authors come to the conclusion that C4.5 is preferable
to Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) due to C4.5’s
detection rate of above 99% [4]. In [5] they attempt to distinguish two encrypted traffic
types, SSH and Skype traffic, using C4.5, SVM, and Naı¨ve Bayes. Once again they do
not use IP addresses, port numbers, or payload data to detect SSH. C4.5 had the highest
detection rate with 99.6%. In [6] the authors continue to use ML algorithms to classify
encrypted network traffic flows, without port numbers, IP addresses, or payload information
and use four datasets—three captured in the real-world and one simulated—for testing.
This research compares SVM, AdaBoost with decision stumps, Naı¨ve Bayes, C4.5, and
RIPPER across all four datasets, when trying to detect either SSH or Skype traffic. C4.5
produced the highest accuracy across all captured datasets and SVM produced the highest
accuracy for the simulated dataset. They also show a drop from 97% to 83.7% detection
rate for the C4.5 algorithm when testing over a different dataset than training. While this
is not as good as training and testing on the same set, they claim the 83.7% detection rate
shows robustness in C4.5 and demonstrates its feasiblity in use across networks. In 2011,
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood compared C4.5, AdaBoost with decision stumps, and
team-based Genetic Programming (GP) [7]. They compared the three learning algorithms
when attempting to detect SSH traffic in a mixture of other traffic. They also trained
on feature sets generated from one dataset and tested on the other networks. C4.5 once
again out-performed the other algorithms when detecting only SSH or Skype traffic on
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the network on which it was trained. C4.5 and team-based GP performed comparably
when classifying traffic on networks not used for training. They report team-based GP
outperforming C4.5 when classifying applications within SSH tunnels.
In 2012, Nguyen et al. discuss the need for “timely and continuous” classification [36].
They define timely classification as not relying on the entire flow for classification, but
rather using a predefined number of consecutive packets. They also define continuous
classification as not relying on the beginning of the flow, but rather the classifier should
be able to classify a traffic flow when given a middle subset of the flow. A timely and
continuous network traffic flow classifier should be able to classify flow based on any subset
of consecutive packets with the predefined length. To test the feasibility of using timely and
continous classification they test C4.5 and Naı¨ve Bayes on a sliding window of consecutive
packets, with varying packet lengths. The dataset used for their experiments came from a
network capture with two application types for classification, a game—Wolfenstein: Enemy
Territory—and Voice Over IP (VOIP). Both algorithms had performance degradation when
classifying data that did not include the beginning of the flow. The authors attribute this,
in part, to the classifier no longer knowing the direction of the flows; i.e., it could not
distinguish client from server. C4.5 and Naı¨ve Bayes performed similarly. The authors
conclude that when classifying on consecutive packets that do not include the beginning of
the flow, the features used to train should include subflows that do not use the intial packets
as well. The authors also report that subflows that begin a thousand packets into a flow
have better precision and recall than subflows that are between one and ten packets into
the subflow. This indicates that flow features reach a steady state over time. The research
presented in the following chapters of this paper studies the timely but not continuous
classification of many types of TLS traffic.
In 2004, Wright et al. built a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to classify network
traffic [49]. They used a dataset created from real network captures at George Mason
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University (GMU). The GMU dataset determined the labels of the flows by port number.
They recognize this is not 100% true, but needed a method to automatically classify enough
traffic for testing their HMM methods. They had accuracy ranging from 29% to 86.4%
with the best model depending on the type of traffic. In 2006, they published another
paper yielding better results with the same dataset [50]. They rely solely on packet timing,
sizing, and direction information. No data is collected from TCP/IP headers. They report
detection rates from 75% to 100% when using eight types of flows with aggragate traffic.
When classifying actual traffic flows, the reported accuracy ranges from 57.7% to 96.7%
depending on the traffic type. Wright et al. also worked on tracking the number of
connections within a single encrypted tunnel.
In 2009, Wright et al. [51] published a technique, called traffic morphing, that made
one type of network traffic resemble another with the intent of hiding traffic from ML
analyses. They report successfully lowering the accuracy of a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier
from 98.4% to 63.4%. In 2012, Dyer et al. publish a report about overcoming traffic
morphing and other counter measures that rely on padding [22]. Dyers et al. test multiple
classifiers on three datasets and attempt to classify the websites. The authors report Naı¨ve
Bayes and SVM perform comparably and return accuracies greater than 60% against all
countermeasures.
2.7 Summary
This chapter presents background information to understand the research and
contributions described in the following chapters. The need for network analysis—
especially of web service traffic—is given, followed by the current solutions and problems
in network analysis. TLS and ML algorithms are also discussed with a focus on C4.5 and
AdaBoost, due to their prevalence in the following chapters.
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III. Methodology
This chapter describes the methodology for testing the effectiveness of five ML
algorithms in classifying the web services within encrypted network traffic flows.
Section 3.1 discusses the goals of the research, the hypotheses tested, and the approach
used. Section 3.2 introduces the system being tested and the inputs and outputs of the
system. Section 3.3 describes the dataset used to test the ML algorithms and how it was
created. The chapter concludes by describing the factors used in the experiments, how they
are evaulated, and the experimental design.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to determine the effectiveness of ML algorithms in
classifying a web service associated with a TLS traffic flow. ML efficacy is determined
by classification accuracy, as defined in Section 3.5. It is hypothesized that the tested ML
algorithms will successfully classify web services associated with encrypted network flows.
In addition to determining whether the ML algorithms can classify the data, this research
further analyzes how many packets of the flow are necessary to classify that flow. It is
expected that shortening the amount of time on which the features are calculated decreases
the accuracy. The time necessary to train a ML algorithm and the amount of time required
to classify flows using the algorithm is also discussed.
3.1.2 Approach.
The strategic goal of this research effort is to prevent data exfiltration through
encrypted communications. Due to the nature of encryption, network security devices
that rely solely on DPI cannot detect data exfiltration in encrypted traffic. By measuring
the effectiveness of ML in classifying encrypted network traffic flows, this research will
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increase the ability to detect data exfiltration. While determining the web service is not
sufficient to definitively determine a network traffic flow as containing sensitive data, it
is a necessary first step. This research focuses on classfiying encrypted web services due
to TLS’s increasing prevalence. Determining the web service can be used for broader
policies. For example, some web services such as social networking could be in violation
of network policy. Others, such as web mail, could be considered high risk and warrant
additional inspection.
This experiment uses real world data to test the efficacy of ML algorithms in
classifying the application within an encrypted flow. By using features calculated directly
from real-world network traffic flows—where the web service is already known—as input
samples to the ML algorithm, the accuracy of the ML algorithm when classifying the
endpoint web service can be directly measured.
3.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT), shown in Figure 3.1, is the Flow Identification System
(FIS). The FIS consists of the ML framework and the computer on which the framework
runs. The ML framework includes two components: one that trains—or creates—the
ML classifier, and one that uses the ML classifier to classify network traffic flows. Both
components of the ML framework are under test as the classifier’s accuracy is dependent
upon the trainer. Encrypted flows are given to the trainer which generates the classifier
used in the second component. The encrypted flows are given to the SUT as an Attribute-
Relation File Format (ARFF) file. ARFF is a file format that stores the traffic flow as a
label and a list of attributes. The attributes include the sizing information of the traffic flow.
These attributes are discussed more in Section 3.3 and are used as the classifying features
for the ML algorithm. When the ARFF files are used for training, the label is included for
each traffic flow. The ARFF files constitute the workload for the SUT.
26
In addition to this workload, there are system parameters that affect the accuracy of
the ML framework. These parameters control how the ML classifier is created and are
discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.
The flows used to train and test the ML algorithm are collected from a single computer
network as described in Section 3.3.1. It is expected that different computer networks
will produce different results [6, 7]. While a ML algorithm trained on one network is not
expected to be as accurate on another network, it is expected that the results from this
research effort can still apply to other networks if the training and classification data comes
from the same network. However, the accuracy of the algorithms is expected to decrease
as differences between the data used to train and test the classifiers increase.
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Figure 3.1: Flow Identification System
3.3 Workload
The workload of the SUT consists of the encrypted flows. The amount of time
necessary to classify each flow is dependent upon the how the classifier was trained. ML
classifiers are entirely dependent upon the network flows used to train the ML algorithm.
The following parameters are used when creating the workload.
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• Flow length analyzed
The amount of the network traffic flow analyzed when calculating the features is
defined as the number of packets from the beginning of the flow, referenced as the
First N Packets. Nguyen et al. showed using the beginning of the flow to be more
accurate in their research, and using the beginning of the flow allows for the least
delay in classifying [36]. The accuracy of the ML algorithm is expected to decrease
as N decreases. Connection-based traffic consists of three basic parts: handshake,
communication, and teardown. A decrease in N will remove the teardown stage and
limit the information the ML classifier has to classify the traffic flow. As the amount
of data used continue to decrease, the accuracy is hypothesized to decrease. The
same N is used for training and testing the ML algorithm. Appendix A includes the
results of alternate experiments where time is used to determine flow lengths. First N
packets is chosen as the defining length of flow for two reasons, its ease of use, and
the inherit additional information in using time elapsed. By using microseconds as
the primary measure, timing data are confounded with the sizing data.
• The characteristics documented and used for the ML features
In previous research Moore et al. used 249 features to describe a network traffic
flow [33]. A subset of these 249 features is used to conduct this research. Features
pertaining to the sizing and number of packets within in the traffic flows are the focus
of this research, with some additional features based on TCP flags. These features
are chosen due to their expected speed of calculation when compared to some of
Moore’s other features, such as Fast Fourier Transforms (FFTs). Little saved state
is required and simple arithmetic is sufficient to calculate all used features, making
these features efficient for a near-real-time device. The final feature set is listed in
Table 3.1. Alternate experiments are run with an additional 21 timing-based features,
as discussed in Appendix A.
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Table 3.1: Features
Feature Description
1-21*† Number of bytes in Ethernet packet
22-42*† Number of bytes in IP packet
43-63*† Number of bytes in IP and TCP headers
64-65 Number of packets
66-67 Number of packets with TCP ack flag set
68-69 Number of packets with only the ack flag set
70-71 Number of packets with TCP optional SACK Blocks
72-73 Max number of SACK blocks in a single packet
74-75 Number of packets with ack flag set and SACK information
76-77 Number of packets with TCP payloads
78-79 Number of combined bytes within TCP payloads
80-81 Number of packets with the TCP push flag set
82-83 Number of packets with TCP syn flag set
84-85 Number of packets with fin flag set
86-87 Was a packet sent allowing SACK blocks (Value is Y or N)
88-89 Number of packets with TCP urgent flag set
90-91 Number of combined bytes within packets that have urgent flag set
All values are calculated for both Client to Server and Server to Client
† –Values are also calculated across entire flow
* –Value is collected per packet and the following 7 stats are computed:
Minimum; First Quartile; Mean; Median; Third Quartile; Maximum; Variance
The first three rows have 21 features each: 7 stats for each Client to Server, Server to Client, and entire flow.
Refer to [31] for more information on Selective Acknowlegment (SACK)
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• Label
Every encrypted flow has a label. The goal of the system is to correctly label
encrypted TLS flows. The label is an important workload parameter since it almost
certainly affects the accuracy of the system. Certain labels might be recognized with
more accuracy and, even if classification is not successful for every label, accurately
identifying particular labels could still help fulfill the goal. The labels used in this
experiment are described below and listed in Table 3.2.
3.3.1 Workload Generation.
The flows for the workload are captured from a real-world research network at the
Air Force Institute of Technology. The traffic is captured continuously over a seven day
period. The seven day period is considered to be representative of a typical week for the
network. This traffic is separated into traffic flows using the same 5-tuple as Moore et al.
in [48]. 1,527,185 TCP streams are found and 991,198 UDP streams are found. Out of all
the TCP streams, 218,814—14.3%—of them use TLS. Due to ML algorithms’ need for
sizable datasets when classifying, an automated system for classifying the web services is
required [48]. Since TLS traffic has an optional field for using plain text server names when
initializing encrypted connections, tests are done to determine the frequency of the field’s
usage, and which server names are used. Of the TLS streams, 204,150—93.3%—have the
optional server name. Of those only 2,825 unique server names are used. Furthermore,
109,959—53.9% of the TLS flows with server names—are using the 17 most common
server names. All but one of those 17 server names are chosen as the labels for the dataset.
The most used server name, with 54,711 flows, is an update server. Due to the number and
small size of these flows, they are not considered in this research. Human readable forms
of the 16 selected labels with the associated number of flows are listed in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Labels
Label Number of Flows
Gmail 10930
Google.com 6671
Google Plus 6502
Facebook 5154
CacWebMail 4701
iCloud 4436
Microsoft Update 4330
Google Safebrowsing 3689
Mesh Accounts 3012
Live Messenger 2028
bitbucket 1067
Metric Static 911
BlackBoard 599
Google IMAP 585
Yahoo IMAP 403
Google Docs 230
Total 55248
3.4 System Services
The FIS provides one service: classification of traffic flows. Each traffic flow is
classified by the ML algorithm as one of the labels used to train the ML algorithm. This
label is the output of the system. Table 3.2 provides a complete list of labels. For each
classification, the system is either correct (a True Positive (TP)) or incorrect. If the system
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is incorrect then it is a False Positive (FP) for the resulting label and a False Negative (FN)
for the true label. Similarly, when a TP occurs it is a True Negative (TN) for all other labels.
3.5 Performance Metrics
The primary performance metric of the system is the accuracy of the traffic flow
classifications. The accuracy of each factor set is calculated as follows,
Accuracy =
Number o f Correct Classi f ications
Number o f All Tested S amples
. (3.1)
For a multiclass classifier, such as this system, the overall accuracy is also the combined,
weighted True Positive Rate (TPR) across all classifications. The amount of time necessary
to train each algorithm is also reported, as given by the ML framework. The average CPU
time each algorithm requires to classify a single test flow is calculated by,
Runtime =
Time Required to Classi f y Test S amples
Number o f Tested S amples
. (3.2)
To be feasibly used in a near-real-time classifying system, the runtime should be low
enough for the classifying system to maintain network throughput.
3.6 System Parameters
The system parameters include the individual ML algorithm parameters. The
specifications of the computer used to host the ML framework also affects the metrics
because it affects system performance and the amount of time necessary to train and test
the ML being considered. This research focuses on the J4.8 ML algorithm, an open
source variation of C4.5. The following parameters affect how the algorithm creates the
decision tree. The default values referred to are the values given by the Weka 3.6.7
toolkit. For more detailed information on the Weka toolkit, the J4.8 algorithm, and the
possible configurations see [48]. The default parameters for all ML algorithms are used
for this research, unless otherwise specified. While tuning the algorithms by attempting to
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optimize the parameters is common, the default parameters produce acceptable results and
time constraints limited the scope of this research.
3.6.1 J4.8 Parameters.
• Binary Splits
If binary splits are used, the nodes of the decision tree will have at most two subtrees.
This parameter is either true or false. Binary trees are not used for this study.
• Minimum Number of Objects
This number defines the minimum number of training samples associated with any
leaf of the tree. Higher numbers lead to a more general tree, but at the possible cost
of accuracy. The default value for this parameter is 2; the value must be a positive
integer.
• Laplace Estimator
The Laplace estimator is used to eliminate problems that come from dividing by
probabilities of zero. This can increase the accuracy of the classifier if not all
possibilities are covered in the data used to create the decision tree. The Laplace
estimator is not used by default and will not be used herein. The value of this
parameter is either true or false.
• Pruning
Pruning reduces the number of nodes in the tree, making it simpler. Simpler trees not
only make it easier to analyze the relationships, but also make the resultant decision
more general. If pruning is disabled, the following parameters are not used. Pruning
is enabled by default and is used in this study.
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– Subtree Raising
Subtree Raising occurs when a parent node in the decision tree is replaced with
one of its child nodes. While subtree raising simplifies the tree and enhances
pruning, it is time consuming and increases the time of tree generation. Subtree
Raising is used by default and is used for this study.
– Modified J4.8 Reduced Error Pruning
If this feature is on the ML trainer uses a modified reduced error pruning method
instead of the default C4.5 method of pruning. Modified J4.8 Reduced error
pruning is not used by default and will not be used for this experiment.
– Confidence Factor
Smaller confidence factors cause less pruning and a less general decision tree.
The confidence factor is only used with the C4.5 pruning method, it is not used
in conjunction with the J4.8 modified reduced error pruning. The confidence
factor is a decimal number between 0 and 1, the default value is 0.25 and is
used for this experiment.
3.6.2 AdaBoost Parameters.
• ML Classifier
The ML algorithm that is being boosted. DecisionStump is the default in Weka. This
research looks at the effect of using J4.8 as the boosted classifier.
• Number of Iterations
The number of iterations AdaBoost uses to boost the classifier. The default is 10,
which is what is used in this research.
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• Seed
The number used to seed the random number generator for re-weighting the samples.
One is the default and is used in this research.
• Resampling
If this parameter is true the AdaBoost algorithm uses resampling instead of
reweighting. The default parameter of false is used.
• Weight Threshold
This is the threshold at which pruning occurs. This is set to 100 by default, which is
what is used in this research.
3.6.3 Computer System Parameters.
The system parameters affect the amount of time necessary to train and test the ML
algorithms. All experiments are run on a Dell T7500 with 12 gigabytes of Random Access
Memory (RAM) and a 2.67 gigahertz six-core Intel Xeon processor. Ubuntu 12.04 is the
operating system, and Weka is run using Java 1.6.
3.7 Factors
• Flow Length Analyzed
The flow length used for classification determines the amount of data the ML
algorithm has to train and classify each network flow. The flow length analyzed
is tested to determine how many packets are necessary to classify the endpoint web
services of the network traffic flow. If the required flow length is sufficiently short,
ML could be used in real-time detection devices.
– Complete Traffic Flow
The complete traffic flow is classified to determine the best expected accuracy
the ML algorithm.
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– First N Packets
The first N packets are used to test, with N ranging from one to twenty. Twenty
was experimentally determined to be after the performace peak with respect to
accuracy.
• ML Algorithm
Five ML algorithms are used in this research: J4.8, AdaBoost+J4.8, Naı¨ve Bayes,
NBTree, and SVM. These algorithms are described in Chapter 2 and were chosen
due to their previously reported results.
Table 3.3: Factor Levels
Factors Levels
Flow Length Analyzed All; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14;
(Number of Packets) 15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 20
ML Algorithm J4.8; AdaBoost+J4.8; Naı¨ve Bayes; NBTree;
SVM
3.8 Evaluation Technique
The workload is created from real network data as discussed in Section 3.3. Thus,
direct measurement is used to evaluate the SUT. Version 3.6.7 of the Weka Toolkit trains
and tests the ML algorithm. Weka’s implementation of the 5 ML algorithms are used for
this experiment, with the exception of LibSVM taken from [12]. 10-fold cross validation is
used for testing. The workload is divided into 10 equal folds of network traffic flows. Each
fold is iteratively used for testing after the remaining nine folds are used for training. The
results of the 10 iterations are averaged to produce the mean accuracy for that experiment.
Using 10-fold cross validation is standard in ML experiments and increases the fidelity
37
of the results by guaranteeing every flow is used to both train and test, across separate
iterations [48]. Direct measurement is used since the network data and flow features are
recorded from real network traffic, and that data is used by the ML framework to test the
ML algorithms. By using real network data the results of the research are applicable for
use in real networks.
3.9 Experimental Design
Due to time constraints a partial factorial design is used. Refer to Table 3.3 and
Section 3.7 for the factors used in these experiments. Experiments are run testing all 5 ML
algorithms at an experimentally-determined packet level, for 5 experiments. Pilot studies
show classifying the first 12 packets produces high accuracy. Every flow length is tested
with the best two algorithms for 21∗2 = 42 experiments. Although 10-fold cross validation
is used for every experiment, it is still typical to run 10 repetitions of every experiment to
measure variance and for a better measure of accuracy [48]. The same set of folds is
used within a repetition and the folds are randomly regenerated between repetitions. Thus,
5 + 42 = 47 unique experiments * 10 replications results in 470 total experiments. The
focus of this research is the efficacy of ML algorithms in classifying encrypted flows and
the number of packets necessary to correctly classify these flows. The research achieves this
goal by focusing the experimental setup on testing the flow length analyzed. 10 iterations
of 10-fold cross validation is expected to result in a narrow confidence interval at 95%
confidence. This level of confidence is necessary, because misclassifications could lead to
data exfiltration. Due to the randomness of generating the folds, the entire workload can be
used for each 10-fold cross validation.
3.10 Methodology Summary
Data exfiltration is a growing concern for organizations. With an increasing amount of
applications using encrypted web services, tools that can assist in web service classification
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would improve network security. This research determines the feasibility of using ML
algorithms to classify endpoint web services using encrypted network flows. Furthermore,
if classifying encrypted network flows is feasible, then the flow length needed to classify is
experimentally determined. If the web service can be classified quickly enough, then this
strategy of application identification could be used as a first step in near-real-time network
protection devices.
The network data used for testing is real-world data collected from an existing research
network. Features for the samples are generated from the sizing information of encrypted
network traffic. These samples are fed into the Weka toolkit’s implementation of 5 ML
algoritms for training and testing. Experiments are run for each ML algorithm at a single
flow length and the best two are run for all 21 flow lengths. All experiments are evaluated
on the accuracy and runtime of the classifications.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter discusses the results from the experiments detailed in Chapter 3.
Section 4.1 analyzes the results from the experiment with all five ML algorithms.
Section 4.2 analyzes the effects of flow length on the accuracy and runtime of J4.8.
Section 4.3 discusses AdaBoost+J4.8 and the difference in results between the two
algorithms. Section 4.4 summarizes the results.
4.1 Algorithm Comparison
The accuracy, time training, and runtime are shown below in Table 4.1. Recall the
runtime is the average CPU time taken to classify a single flow. The time training is reported
in seconds, and the runtime is reported in microseconds. The algorithm comparison
experiment only uses features calculated from the first 12 packets of the flow. Shapiro-Wilk
normality tests confirm that most of the values have normal distributions, and Table 4.1
uses a † to indicate which values are not normal. Recall from Chapter 3 that 10-fold
cross validation is used. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the effects of averaging the 10 folds
on distribution and normality. Figure 4.1 shows a decrease in variance, and Figure 4.2
shows both a decrease in variance and an increase in normality.
A pairwise t-test is run across all pairs of algorithms to determine which algorithms
produce statistically-different accuracy and runtimes. The p-value from these results are
shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis—
that the values are not different—should be rejected within a 95% confidence interval. As
the tables show, all algorithms produce statistically-different results. Note the tables show
values rounded to six decimal places.
Naı¨ve Bayes performs the worst with a mean accuracy of only 0.6238, and while
it classifies faster than NBTree or LibSVM, it is still orders of magnitude slower than
AdaBoost+J4.8 and J4.8. LibSVM has a mean accuracy of 0.9656, which, while only
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Table 4.1: Algorithm Comparison: Mean Values from 10 repetitions
Algorithm Accuracy Time Training (s) Runtime (µs)
NBTree 0.974276 2064.1796 601.63216†
NaiveBayes 0.623773 1.2924 341.098358
AdaBoost+J48 0.979286 113.8176 16.724549†
J48 0.978298 14.4324 2.479733
LibSVM 0.965606 216.5916 2188.477515
† - Indicates the values are not normally distributed
Table 4.2: Statistical Difference in accuracy for All 5 Algorithms
P-Values from t-Test
NBTree NaiveBayes AdaBoost+J48 J48 LibSVM
NBTree 1 0 1.5e-05 8.6e-05 0
NaiveBayes 0 1 0 0 0
AdaBoost+J48 1.5e-05 0 1 0 0
J48 8.6e-05 0 0 1 0
LibSVM 0 0 0 0 1
A P-Value <0.05 indicates the samples are not the same with 95% confidence intervals
being 0.0127 less than J4.8, is 91.0348 standard deviations away. This shows the
apparent similarity in the accuracy is deceiving, as confirmed by the t-test. Both J4.8 and
AdaBoost+J4.8 perform well for accuracy and runtime, with accuracies above 0.978 and
runtimes below 16.725 µs. Tukey tests are not shown, but produce slighty different results.
Due to this, one-way tests, which are non-parametric, are used to verify the t-test’s results.
The slight discrepancies in the Tukey test are suspected to be caused by the fitted model
used, and the Tukey test is suspected to be less accurate.
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Figure 4.1: Violin Plot Showing Effects of 10-Fold Cross Validation on Distribution
The poor runtime of Naı¨ve Bayes, NBTree, and LibSVM could probably be
improved by using feature selection algorithms. Feature selection would eliminate features
determined to be of little use in classifying and reduce the computations needed. This
especially improves the runtime of ML algorithms that require intensive mathematical
calculations, such as Naı¨ve Bayes, NBTree, and LibSVM. Feature selection can also
improve accuracy. Tuning the parameters could also increase the accuracy—and maybe
the runtime—of the three weakest performers, making them more comparable to J4.8
and AdaBoost+J4.8. Of course, it could also increase the performance of J4.8 and
AdaBoost+J4.8, though perhaps less siginificantly.
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Figure 4.2: Violin Plot Showing Effects of 10-Fold Cross Validation on Distribution
Table 4.3: Statistical Difference in Runtime for All 5 Algorithms
P-Values from t-Test
NBTree NaiveBayes AdaBoost+J48 J48 LibSVM
NBTree 1 0 0 0 0
NaiveBayes 0 1 0 0 0
AdaBoost+J48 0 0 1 0 0
J48 0 0 0 1 0
LibSVM 0 0 0 0 1
A P-Value <0.05 indicates the samples are not the same with 95% confidence intervals
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4.2 Flow Length Comparison
This section analyzes the effects of varying the flow length analyzed in the workload
generation on J4.8’s performance. Section 4.3 analyzes AdaBoost+J4.8 and the differences
between the two algorithms across all tested flow lengths.
4.2.1 J4.8.
Table 4.4 shows the mean accuracy, time training, and runtime using J4.8 for all
flow lengths analyzed. As expected, the accuracy and the runtime increase as the flow
length analyzed increases. The accuracy peaks and eventually decreases as the flow
length continues to increase. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show this increase for both J4.8 and
AdaBoost+J4.8. Statistical difference between accuracy is analyzed for every possible
combination of flow length pairs. Once again, t-tests are used to determine which values are
statistically different. Tukey and one-way tests are also run to verify the t-test’s findings.
Although they mostly came to the same statistical conclusions, t-tests are used for the
final conclusion due to earlier concerns with Tukey’s use of fitted models and the inherent
randomness of one-way tests.
Table 4.5 displays which flow lengths produce statistically different accuracy for J4.8.
The X indicates that the two flow lengths—listed by row and column—are not statistically-
different. As the table shows, most flow lengths are statistically different and the highest
accuracy, which is produced by 14 packets, is statistically different from all others. While
being statistically the most accurate, a flow length of 14 packets does not have statistically
different runtimes than flow lengths of 9-10, or 12-16 packets. The accuracy also decreased
beyond 14 packets—including analyzing all available packets—indicating that the flows
characteristics change after the first 14 packets. The increased flow lengths are suspected
to produce worse accuracy due to the addition of end point specific information. This is
further discussed after analyzing the performance of AdaBoost+J4.8. The worst accuracy
can be explained by the unequal number of samples. Simply classifying all flows as the
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most common label—Gmail—results in a 0.1978 accuracy. Distinguishing between the
two most common labels and correctly labeling those—and no others—would result in a
0.3186 accuracy.
Table 4.6 shows which flows produce statistically different runtimes. This table is
similar to Table 4.5, as the X indicates the two flow lengths are not statistically-different.
Two clusters appear and lengths of 9-16 packets and 16-20 packets are not statistically
different within the clusters, with the exception of a flow length of 11 packets. The entire
flow is also clustered with flow lengths of 16-20 packets. While more packets were included
in the feature calculation, the runtime is only the time required for the ML algorithm to
classify not including time taken for feature calculation. No attempt was made to optimize
feature calculation, but the average time taken to calculate and save the features is within an
order of magnitude of the runtime for flow lengths of 1-20 packets. This plateau of runtimes
would indicate that the features provide enough information for J4.8 to create decision trees
of equivalent complexity for flow lengths greater than 15 packets. Figure 4.3 shows a violin
plot comparing the distribution of 10-12 packet flow lengths. It is hypothesized that a flow
length of 11 packets breaks from the cluster due to its skew towards shorter runtimes. The
flow length of 10 packets is skewed toward higher runtimes. Refer to Figure 4.1 for an
example of normally distributed values.
Overall, J4.8 performs well with an accuracy above 97% when only analyzing the
first 10-20 packets of the flow and runtimes less than 3 microseconds for all tests. At
peak accuracy the runtime for classifying a single flow was 2.371126 microseconds, that is
equivalent to classifying 421,740 flows per second. The relative speed of classifying and
high accuracy make J4.8 a good candidate for near-real-time web service classification.
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Table 4.4: Means for Flow Length Comparsion J48
Num Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Runtime (µs)
1 0.238524† 2.554 1.194619
2 0.238524† 2.5344 1.067906
3 0.348331† 3.4348† 1.104102
4 0.349491 6.0195 1.466129†
5 0.34903 6.5041 1.484212†
6 0.899841 8.5593 1.882422
7 0.899938 9.3896 2.081517
8 0.916846 10.7701 2.117722
9 0.924989 12.803 2.353026
10 0.973735 10.9558 2.280615†
11 0.973842 11.2326 2.135819†
12 0.978298 13.4345 2.35303
13 0.979348 14.839 2.407332
14 0.979979 14.3684 2.371126†
15 0.979022 15.8042 2.353033
16 0.97834 16.2736 2.497816
17 0.978754 18.186 2.660732†
18 0.978171 19.6132 2.715037
19 0.976392 19.7065 2.715034†
20 0.974513 19.9652 2.805531
All 0.955198 23.5585 2.733133
† - Indicates the values are not normally distributed
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Table 4.5: Statistical Difference of Accuracies in J48 by Flow Length Analyzed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 All
1 - X
2 X -
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 - X
7 X -
8 -
9 -
10 - X
11 X -
12 - X X
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 X - X
17 -
18 X X -
19 -
20 -
All -
X - Indicates the values are not statistically different according to the paired t-test
Table 4.6: Statistical Difference of Runtimes in J48 by Flow Length Analyzed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 All
1 - X X
2 X - X
3 X X -
4 - X
5 X -
6 - X
7 X - X X X
8 X - X X X X
9 X - X X X X X X X
10 X X X - X X X X X X
11 X X X X - X
12 X X X X - X X X X
13 X X X - X X X
14 X X X X - X X
15 X X X X X - X
16 X X X X X X - X X X X X
17 X - X X X X
18 X X - X X X
19 X X X - X X
20 X X X X - X
All X X X X X -
X - Indicates the values are not statistically different according to the paired t-test
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Figure 4.3: Violin Plot Showing (Lack of) Normality for J4.8 Runtimes
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4.3 AdaBoost+J4.8
Table 4.7 shows the mean results from using AdaBoost+J4.8 to classify test samples
with all flow lengths analyzed. Similar to J4.8, the accuracy increases—at least initially—
as the flow length increases. The runtime also increases as flow length increases, although
without an apparent plateau. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 plot the accuracy and runtime versus
flow length. Figure 4.6 shows accuracy versus flow length, but zoomed in on the final
10 flow lengths to show the differences in accuracy more clearly. Table 4.8 shows which
flow lengths produce statistically-different accuracies. As with J4.8, only a handful of the
flow lengths produce statistically similar results, and the highest accuracy—this time 18
packets—was statistically-different from all others. Unlike J4.8, few of the runtimes are
not statistically-different, as shown in Table 4.9. Flow lengths of 17 and 18 packets are
not statistically different from each other in runtime, but are statistically worse than flow
lengths 1-16 and better than 19, 20 packets, or the entire flow.
Recall that AdaBoost works by iterating over the boosted algorithm and varying
weights to create additional classifiers that have less error for these new weightings. These
additional classifiers require more time to train and test. AdaBoost stops iterating if newly
created classifiers cannot improve performance. Figure 4.7 shows the ratio of training and
runtimes between AdaBoost+J4.8 and J4.8. For flow lengths between 1 and 5 packets
the time training, runtime, and accuracy are all very similar or identical; this indicates
that AdaBoost is unable to produce any extra classifiers to improve performance. The
spike in time training and runtime, beginning at 6 packets, indicates that AdaBoost creates
additional classifiers. While the additional classifiers slightly lower accuracy for flow
lengths 6-8, AdaBoost statistically improved J4.8’s accuracy for the flow lengths 9-20 and
when all packets are available.
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Table 4.7: Means for Flow Length Comparison AdaBoost+J48
Num Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Runtime (µs)
1 0.238524† 2.5909 1.176507
2 0.238524† 2.5895† 1.321329
3 0.348331† 3.4874 1.267011†
4 0.349491 6.0863 1.520428
5 0.34903 6.5356† 1.502338†
6 0.899486 80.7932 14.172457
7 0.89947 84.5713 13.900967
8 0.916274 89.3318 13.321739
9 0.926048 106.1684 15.638576
10 0.974605 90.4441 13.339829
11 0.974533 95.3992 13.756144
12 0.979286 105.82 15.457567
13 0.980653 117.322 16.815069
14 0.981362 122.5245 18.136428
15 0.980924 137.6435 19.693045
16 0.981782 140.5467 20.127418
17 0.982906 158.178 21.285831
18 0.984104 160.4537 21.557334
19 0.983078 164.6682 21.99176
20 0.983056 174.626 22.715774†
All 0.969943 249.8702 25.249793
† - Indicates the values are not normally distributed
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Figure 4.4: Plot of Accuracy by First N Packets for J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8
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Table 4.8: Statistical Difference of Accuracies in AdaBoost+J48 by Flow Length Analyzed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 All
1 - X
2 X -
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 - X
7 X -
8 -
9 -
10 - X
11 X -
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 - X X
18 -
19 X - X
20 X X -
All -
X - Indicates the values are not statistically different according to the paired t-test
Table 4.9: Statistical Difference of Runtimes in AdaBoost+J48 by Flow Length Analyzed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 All
1 - X X
2 X - X X
3 X X -
4 - X
5 X X -
6 - X X
7 X - X
8 - X X
9 - X
10 X -
11 X X X -
12 X -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 - X
18 X -
19 -
20 -
All -
X - Indicates the values are not statistically different according to the paired t-test
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Table 4.10 shows the statistical differences between accuracies and runtimes of J4.8
and AdaBoost+J4.8 for every flow length analyzed. Statistical difference is tested with
pairwise t-tests at a 95% confidence interval. Running Friedman tests—which are non-
parametric—also indicate that the J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 perform differently, even taking
the different datasets into account. As with the t-tests, a 95% confidence interval is used
for the Friedman tests. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the increase in runtime is much more
significant than the increase in accuracy.
The increase in accuracy as flow lengths increase is explainable by the addition of
information about each flow as more packets are used to calculate the features. The spike
at the flow length of 6 packets is probably due to the resolution of the TCP handshake
and the beginning of web service-specific information. The accuracy continues to increase
as a higher percentage of the information acquired is web service-specific. This includes
TLS handshake, which takes as little as six packets—for a total of nine packets into the
flow—to complete. The peak and eventual decrease of the accuracy could be due to the
introduction of confounding data. Differences in browsers or user profiles could affect the
page content being returned and introduce additional variability. The accuracy of analyzing
the full flow is lower than the accuracy of analyzing flow lengths 10-20 for both algorithms.
This indicates that flows continue to become more unpredictable after the initial peak.
AdaBoost+J4.8’s later peak in accuracy is due to AdaBoost’s additional classifiers. By
comparing the first 5 accuracies it is apparent that AdaBoost did not successfully reduce
the error with additional classifiers and used the same classifier that J4.8 produced. This is
not surprising as J4.8 is deterministic and will always produce the same decision tree with
the same input samples. AdaBoost’s additional classifiers most likely increase accuracy
after the first 9 packets due to the ability of additional classifiers to more accurately handle
less common branches in the original tree.
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Table 4.10: Statistical Difference of Accuracies and Runtimes
Number of Packets Accuracy Runtime (µs)
1 - -
2 - J
3 - -
4 - -
5 - -
6 J J
7 J J
8 J J
9 A J
10 A J
11 A J
12 A J
13 A J
14 A J
15 A J
16 A J
17 A J
18 A J
19 A J
20 A J
All A J
J - Indicates J4.8 was statistically different and better.
A - Indicates AdaBoost+J4.8 was statistically different and better.
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AdaBoost+J4.8 also performs well with an accuracy above 98% when analyzing only
the first 13-20 packets of the flow and has runtimes less than 23 microseconds for all tests.
Effectively classifying 46,387 flows a second. If 23 microseconds per flow is fast enough
for a near-real time device to classify all web service traffic without becoming overloaded,
then AdaBoost+J4.8 is a better decision than J4.8, because of the improved accuracy. It
would take AdaBoost+J4.8 less than 5 seconds to classify all TLS flows seen in a week
on the test network (compared to 0.52 seconds for J4.8), this shows the feasibility of using
either algorithm in a near-real-time device for the test network. If runtime is a concern, J4.8
is almost an order of magnitude faster and—with less than 1% drop in accuracy—could be
the better choice.
4.4 Summary
With the default parameters J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 outperformed Naı¨ve Bayes,
NBTree, and LibSVM in both accuracy and runtime. In a more detailed analysis J4.8
has a faster runtime than AdaBoost+J4.8 for flow lengths of greater than 5 packets, and
AdaBoost+J4.8 has a higher accuracy for flow lengths greater than 8 packets. The runtimes
of both algorithms increase as the flow length analyzed increases. The accuracy for both
algorithms increases initially before peaking, and eventually decreasing. AdaBoost+J4.8
peaks later than J4.8, due to AdaBoost’s additional classifiers. The peak and eventual
decline is believed to be due to greater variation per user occuring later in the flow. J4.8
and AdaBoost+J4.8 are both feasible for use in near-real-time devices and, depending on
the requirements, either could be preferred.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the results of the research. Section 5.1 discusses the
conclusions based on the results in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 lists the contributions of this
research, and Section 5.3 describes the recommendations for future work. Section 5.4
summarizes this chapter.
5.1 Conclusions
The workload for the ML algorithms tested is generated as described in Section 3.3.1.
A DPI method is used to automatically classify the web services within encrypted network
flows using an optional TLS field. While this method can only classify encrypted flows that
use the optional field, it labels a sufficient number of flows to test the effectiveness of the
ML algorithms.
Five ML algorithms—Naı¨ve Bayes, NBTree, LibSVM, J4.8, and AdaBoost+J4.8—
are tested against flow lengths of 12 packets. J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 perform the best
for both accuracy and runtime. Naı¨ve Bayes was not further considered due to its low
accuracy. LibSVM and NBTree were not further considered due to their high runtimes.
J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 are further tested for flow lengths of 1-20 packets and for the
entire flow. They produce statistically-different results for both accuracies and runtimes
for flow lengths of 5 or more packets, with J4.8 being faster whenever a difference exists.
AdaBoost+J4.8 is statistically more accurate for flow lengths of 9-20 packets.
This research found both J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 to be suitable for near-real-
time detection devices. For flow lengths of 10-20 packets, J4.8 classifies over
97% of flows correctly in less than 3 microseconds. For flow lengths of 13-20
packets, AdaBoost+J4.8 classifies over 98% of flows correctly with runtimes under 23
microseconds. Both algorithms produce higher accuracies when not using the entire
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traffic flow. If AdaBoost+J4.8 can classify flows fast enough to meet a network’s
throughput requirements, it is recommended above the other algorithms tested. If the
device could be expected to classify in less time, then J4.8 is the recommended algorithm,
as the peak accuracy decreases by less than 0.5% while the runtime is less than 11% of
AdaBoost+J4.8’s.
5.2 Contributions
This research presents two ML algorithms for use in classifying the web service within
an encrypted TLS flow and shows ML algorithms can achieve acceptable accuracy in this
context. This work furthers the current research in the field by contributing the proven
capability to classify applications that utilize TLS to communicate through the Internet. As
more applications shift to include web or cloud-based services, this becomes increasingly
important. In addition to introducing the ability of ML algorithms to classify web services,
this research also expands on the number of labels used in ML-based traffic classification
research. It also directly analyzes the performance effects of using AdaBoost in conjunction
with J4.8 on web service classification.
This research also analyzes the time necessary to classify an encrypted traffic flow on
modern systems. The feature set used, with the two algorithms selected shows excellent
results with the ability of a ML algorithm to classify a week’s worth of real network TLS
traffic in less than 5 seconds using the slower of the algorithms. This speed of classification
shows the feasibility of this technique for malware intrusion and data exfiltration prevention
in near-real-time network analysis devices.
A new method of dataset generation is also described. By using the TLS optional
server name, large amounts of captured network data can be automatically labeled for
testing. This new method is also network independent, although the specific labels are
expected to change per network. A subset of features used in previous work is defined and
a software tool is created that calculates these features within an acceptable delay.
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5.3 Future Work
The items listed below are suggestions for future work that could expand on the
research presented here.
• Use Web Service Types as Labels
Other research classifies flows labeled by application type—i.e., Mail or P2P—
instead of web service. Flows such as Google Plus and Facebook could be combined
into a social networking label. Labels such as Google IMAP and Yahoo IMAP could
be combined into an IMAP label. By attempting to combine labels into broader
categories ML algorithms could provide insight into similarities between grouped
labels.
• Test On Other Networks
As discussed in Chapter 3, performance is expected to change for different networks.
It would be useful to test how accurate the same ML algorithms are at classifying web
services on other networks. Results could be compared when the ML algorithms are
trained on the new test networks and when they are trained on the current network
then tested on the new network.
• Test Changes Over Time
Networks are dynamic and change over time. The accuracy of the classifiers could
change as the networks change. Running the same experiment with data collected
from the same network at a later date could provide information on the stability of the
results reported in this document and on how the network has changed. Furthermore,
using classifiers created during this reasearch to classify flows captured at later dates
would provide information on how often the classifiers need updating.
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• Vary Number of Training Samples
As shown in Appendix A, removing the least common label increases accuracy. Further
experiments that vary the number of training samples could find a recommended number
of samples to use for creating the ML classifier.
• Using a MITM DPI Device to Label Flows
As discussed in Chapter 2, some DPI devices intercept and decrypt encrypted flows to
inspect the unecrypted traffic. Using one of these devices to inspect the unencrypted
traffic and label the flow, while training and testing ML algorithms on features
calculated from the encrypted flow would provide a broader range of labels for
classification.
• Test With More Flow Lengths
Testing with additional flow lengths could reveal an additional peak in accuracy or
a plateau in runtimes for flow lengths greater than 20 packets. While these would
require the ML algorithm to wait for more packets before beginning analysis, if there
is a dramatic change waiting could be beneficial.
• Test With Additional Algorithms
Testing with other ML algorithms or performing parameter tuning on the tested
algorithms could produce better results for either the measured accuracy or runtime.
5.4 Summary
This chapter discusses the results and conclusions of the thesis. The contributions to
the field are presented, and several suggestions for future work are listed.
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Appendix: Additional Experiments
A.1 Timing Experiments
The experiments listed below were run with 10 iterations of 10-fold cross validation.
They were run before the final experiments analyzed in Chapter 4. Time Testing is listed
in seconds and is the total time it took to classify all testing flows.
A.1.1 Results with Original Features.
Tables A.1 and A.2 show the results of classifying the encrypted flows with flow length
analyzed defined as either number of packets or microseconds.
Table A.1: J4.8 Performance with Flow Length as Packets
Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Time Testing (s)
1 0.2385 3.202 0.0074
2 0.2385 3.371 0.0072
3 0.3483 4.304 0.0069
4 0.3495 7.227 0.0083
5 0.349 8.513 0.0087
6 0.8998 10.78 0.0122
7 0.8999 11.21 0.013
8 0.9168 12.61 0.0141
9 0.925 15.41 0.0151
10 0.9737 13.14 0.0131
11 0.9738 13.31 0.0138
12 0.9783 15.42 0.0147
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Table A.2: J4.8 Performance with Flow Length as Mircoseconds
MicroSeconds Accuracy Time Training (s) Time Testing (s)
1000 0.3206 3.943 0.0076
2000 0.4333 5.512 0.008
3000 0.4344 8.714 0.0098
4000 0.4341 8.372 0.0091
5000 0.9 11.5 0.012
10000 0.9 12.13 0.0136
15000 0.9168 12.81 0.0139
20000 0.9249 15.41 0.0144
25000 0.9735 13.63 0.0133
30000 0.9737 13.57 0.0133
35000 0.9783 15.8 0.0143
40000 0.9794 17.43 0.0169
45000 0.9804 17.65 0.0155
50000 0.9797 19.79 0.0177
A.1.2 Results with Timing Features.
Tables A.4 and A.5 use the features described in Appendix A.1.2, which is Table 3.1
with additional timing features added.
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Table A.3: Features with Timing
Feature Description
1-21*† Number of bytes in Ethernet packet
22-42*† Number of bytes in IP packet
43-63*† Number of bytes in IP and TCP headers
64-65 Number of packets
66-67 Number of packets with TCP ack flag set
68-69 Number of packets with only the ack flag set
70-71 Number of packets with TCP optional SACK Blocks
72-73 Max number of SACK blocks in a single packet
74-75 Number of packets with ack flag set and SACK information
76-77 Number of packets with TCP payloads
78-79 Number of combined bytes within TCP payloads
80-81 Number of packets with the TCP push flag set
82-83 Number of packets with TCP syn flag set
84-85 Number of packets with fin flag set
86-87 Was a packet sent allowing SACK blocks (Value is Y or N)
88-89 Number of packets with TCP urgent flag set
90-91 Number of combined bytes within packets that have urgent flag set
92-102*† Interarrival time of packets
All values are calculated for both Client to Server and Server to Client
† –Values are also calculated across entire flow
* –Value is collected per packet and the following 7 stats are computed:
Minimum; First Quartile; Mean; Median; Third Quartile; Maximum; Variance
The first three rows have 21 features each: 7 stats for each Client to Server, Server to Client, and entire flow.
Refer to [31] for more information on Selective Acknowlegment (SACK)
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Table A.4: J4.8 Performance with Flow Length as Packets and Timing Features
Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Time Testing (s)
1 0.2403 6.305 0.0085
2 0.6228 16.17 0.0147
3 0.7231 19.36 0.0164
4 0.7185 30.18 0.0183
5 0.7198 29.9 0.0195
6 0.9285 21.03 0.0149
7 0.9279 20.33 0.0151
8 0.9257 23.36 0.0139
9 0.9316 22.88 0.0141
10 0.9717 23.9 0.015
11 0.9717 28.11 0.0177
12 0.9783 28.58 0.0165
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Table A.5: J4.8 Performance with Flow Length as Microseconds and Timing Features
MicroSeconds Accuracy Time Training (s) Time Testing (s)
1000 0.323 7.259 0.0089
2000 0.7016 16.67 0.0137
3000 0.7234 24.33 0.0158
4000 0.7185 30.82 0.0192
5000 0.9293 20.65 0.0142
10000 0.9293 20.36 0.015
15000 0.9279 23.2 0.0143
20000 0.9308 27.66 0.0165
25000 0.9718 25.34 0.0166
30000 0.9724 28.92 0.0175
35000 0.9761 28.65 0.016
40000 0.9792 28.47 0.0175
45000 0.9793 28.36 0.0175
50000 0.9793 31.54 0.0191
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A.2 Most Common Labels
Tables A.6 and A.7 are created from experiments identical to those in Chapter 4 with
the least common label—Google Docs—removed. The accuracy increases for all flow
lengths. Sample runs of the experiments show Google Docs to be the label with the
lowest accuracy. There are not enough samples to draw definitive conclusions, but it is
hypothesized that the lower number of training samples causes the lower accuracy.
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Table A.6: Means for Flow Length Comparison J48 No Google Docs
Num Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Runtime (µs)
1 0.239522 2.5337† 1.181425†
2 0.239522 2.5459† 1.181428
3 0.349784† 3.3846 1.254139
4 0.350958† 6.0295 1.544939
5 0.350503 6.5407† 1.363184
6 0.903283 8.6468 1.872113
7 0.903412 8.794 2.035696†
8 0.920375 10.5857 2.108397
9 0.92838 12.0611 2.344678†
10 0.977182 11.1637 2.126585
11 0.977344 11.069 2.217461
12 0.981686 13.3913 2.39922
13 0.982833 14.9458 2.39922
14 0.98352† 14.1251 2.453733†
15 0.982687 15.2254 2.344685†
16 0.98218 16.3038 2.526447
17 0.98216 17.0873 2.617313
18 0.981984 19.5797 2.744549
19 0.980139 19.1842 2.690033†
20 0.977333 20.6291 2.871792†
All 0.958957 22.7547 2.72638†
† - Indicates the values are not normally distributed
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Table A.7: Means for Flow Length Comparison AdaBoost+J48 No Google Docs
Num Packets Accuracy Time Training (s) Runtime (µs)
1 0.239522 2.57† 1.126906
2 0.239522 2.5969† 1.181432
3 0.349784† 3.4163 1.272311
4 0.350958† 6.0868 1.544959
5 0.350503 6.5712 1.599481†
6 0.903975† 91.7281 16.503678
7 0.903981 89.835 16.212858
8 0.921068 102.1627 16.249228†
9 0.929585 98.2398 16.849023
10 0.978202 103.8764 16.958091
11 0.978165 102.3776 17.012623
12 0.982766 122.5157 19.084673
13 0.9844 124.457 19.011976
14 0.985103 125.3094 18.921077
15 0.984647 136.2271 19.557225
16 0.985728 138.5325 20.411523†
17 0.986581 144.2625† 20.375149
18 0.987384† 166.9176 21.956452
19 0.986381† 172.6407 22.592617
20 0.985805 195.7394 23.465041
All 0.972507 232.4322 24.319312†
† - Indicates the values are not normally distributed
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A.3 Summary
When the flow length analyzed is defined by number of packets, the accuracy increases
faster when timing features are included, but the overall accuracy is not improved. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, the timing features were not included so the features would better
represent the type of flow, and not the time required to communicate to a particular server.
The number of packets from the beginning of the flow is used as the definition for flow
length instead of microseconds, due to the inherent timing information included in using a
time-based definition. Additional experiments also indicate that increasing the number of
training samples may increase the accuracy.
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